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Abstract—This paper analyzes welfare-state determinants of individual
attitudes toward immigrants—within and across countries—and their
interaction with labor market drivers of preferences. We consider two
mechanisms through which a redistributive welfare system might adjust as
a result of immigration. Under the first model, immigration has a larger
impact on high-income individuals, while under the second one low-
income individuals are those most affected. Individual attitudes are con-
sistent with the first welfare-state model and with labor market determi-
nants. In countries where immigration is unskilled, income is negatively
correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while skill is positively
correlated with them. These relationships are reversed in economies
characterized by skilled migration.
We must end welfare state subsidies for illegal immigrants . . . This
alienates taxpayers and breeds suspicion of immigrants, even though
the majority of them work very hard. Without a welfare state, we
would know that everyone coming to America wanted to work hard
and support himself.—Rep. Ron Paul, R-Texas1
I. Introduction
NO OTHER facet of globalization has spurred as muchpublic debate as the movement of workers across
national boundaries. Even within ideologically homoge-
neous groups, often contradictory positions emerge. U.S.
labor unions, although now officially welcoming Latino and
immigrant members,2 see their rank and file oppose growing
inflows of unskilled foreign workers. Similarly, while Sili-
con Valley entrepreneurs trooped in front of Congress in
1998 to obtain an increase in the number of H-1B visas,
many conservative groups fear immigration and have
fiercely opposed the 2004 proposal of the Bush administra-
tion to grant illegal immigrants legal status as guest work-
ers.
A large portion of the discussion is fueled by the income-
distribution consequences of immigration. Native workers
are concerned about new immigrants of similar skill levels
because they are wary of increasing competition,3 inducing
downward pressure on their incomes and contributing to the
growing feeling of uncertainty that accompanies globaliza-
tion.4 On the other hand, native workers welcome immi-
grants who complement them in the labor market. A second
and not less important dimension of the debate is repre-
sented by the welfare-state channel. In fact, the very exis-
tence in many destination countries of redistributive social
insurance programs is likely to have a magnetic effect on
some unskilled immigrants, interested not only in new job
opportunities, but also in the benefits that come in the form
of subsidized healthcare, unemployment compensation, or
provisions concerning dependants.5 While this type of labor
flow is likely to represent a net burden for the public
finances of the host countries, in general migration can have
the opposite effect on the welfare state, for example, when
migrants are skilled. Regardless of whether immigration
represents a net cost or benefit for public finances, adjust-
ments in the redistribution carried out by the welfare state
are unavoidable. Importantly, this paper shows that the type
of response carried out by the welfare state is a key deter-
minant of the effect of immigration on various subgroups of
the population and, as a consequence, on individual opin-
ions about migration. To shed light on these issues, we
develop a theoretical framework of individual attitudes
toward migration in which the labor market and welfare
state interact with each other as drivers of opinions.
The analysis of the labor market channel follows the
previous literature.6 We focus on two factors of production,
skilled and unskilled labor, and consider cases in which
migrants are either less or more skilled than native workers.
We show that the probability that an individual is pro-
immigration is an increasing (decreasing) function of her
skill in countries where the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants is high (low). The intuition is that
when immigrants are unskilled, they reduce the relative
supply of skilled to unskilled labor in the economy, thus
increasing the skilled wage and reducing the unskilled
wage. The opposite is true when immigrants are more
skilled than natives.
More importantly, in our model we consider two alterna-
tive adjustment mechanisms through which the welfare state
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of the host country can respond to an inflow of immigrants.7
In each welfare-state model, we analyze the effect of an
inflow of either unskilled or skilled foreign workers. While
the former represent a net cost for the welfare state, the
latter are likely to make a positive net contribution to the
system.8 In the first welfare-state model we assume that,
following immigration, the value of per capita benefits is
unaffected, while welfare costs (tax rates) adjust in order to
balance the government’s budget (tax adjustment model).
Assuming a redistributive fiscal system, we find that high-
income individuals are more negatively affected by un-
skilled immigration than low-income individuals—as they
bear most of the additional cost to the welfare system.
However, they are more positively affected than low-
income individuals by skilled immigration. In general, in
the tax adjustment model, immigration has a larger impact
on individuals at the top of the income distribution. In the
second welfare-state model, we assume instead that the
adjustment induced by immigration occurs through changes
in per capita welfare benefits, as tax rates are kept constant
(benefit adjustment model). Under these assumptions, if
immigrants are unskilled relative to natives, the burden of
the worsened fiscal position of the welfare state falls rela-
tively more on individuals at the bottom of the income
distribution. In other words, unskilled immigration nega-
tively affects low-income households to a greater extent
than their high-income counterparts. If immigration is in-
stead skilled—and is thus likely to relax the government’s
budget constraint—it will lead to an improvement in the
position of low-income workers through the welfare-state
channel that is greater than for high-income individuals. In
general, in the benefit adjustment model, it is low-income
individuals who are most affected by immigration. To sum-
marize, in the tax adjustment model we expect individual
income to be negatively correlated with pro-immigration
preferences in countries where the skill composition of
natives relative to immigrants is high (unskilled immigra-
tion), and positively correlated otherwise (skilled immigra-
tion). In the benefit adjustment model, we expect the oppo-
site type of cross-country pattern.9
Our empirical analysis, carried out using the 1995 Na-
tional Identity Module of the International Social Survey
Program, both provides new cross-country evidence for the
role of welfare-state considerations and reinforces the re-
sults in the literature on labor market determinants. In
particular, using a direct and indirect measure of the relative
skill mix of natives to immigrants, we find evidence that is
consistent with the tax adjustment model (according to
which it is high-income individuals who are most affected
through the welfare-state channel) and with labor market
determinants of immigration attitudes. Our results show
that, in countries where natives are on average more skilled
than immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated
with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is
positively correlated with them. These relationships have
the opposite signs in destinations characterized by skilled
migration. We confirm the robustness of these results using
an alternative data set, the European Social Survey, carried
out in 2002–2003 on a different sample of countries.
A growing literature in economics focuses on individual
preferences,10 as they represent a primary determinant of
final policy outcomes (Rodrik, 1995). In this paper we study
welfare-state determinants of migration opinions, for two
main reasons. First, public-finance issues have played a key
role in the historical debate on immigration. However, there
are only a few papers in the literature that investigate
welfare-state determinants of individual attitudes11 and they
either focus on a single country or do not exploit the
variation in the data across countries. In our analysis,
instead, we investigate cross-country heterogeneity in the
impact of individual-level variables by taking advantage of
the variation in the data at both the individual and the
country levels. The second reason for this paper is method-
ological. In the existing literature, the correlation between
individual skill and pro-immigration attitudes is interpreted
as evidence in support of a labor market competition story.12
For example, in the United States and other countries
receiving unskilled migration, the estimated correlation is
positive, which is consistent with the labor market hypoth-
esis. However, given that individual skill and income are
positively correlated, the same pattern would be observed in
the data according to the benefit adjustment model. In other
words, it might well be that skilled individuals are less
opposed to unskilled immigration because they also enjoy
high incomes and do not use public services, relatively
speaking, as much as the unskilled. As a result, it is difficult
to separate the effect of the two channels on individual
attitudes. In general, any other determinant of pro-
immigration attitudes that is correlated with individual skill
7 We assume that individuals take as given one of the two adjustments of
the welfare state, that is respondents do not perceive the adjustment type
as endogenous to immigration. Therefore, ours is not a political-economy
model and is best suited for a short-run analysis. See, among others,
Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) and Ortega (2005) for long-run political-
economy models of migration and the welfare state.
8 As will become clearer in section III, skilled migrant workers are not
necessarily net contributors to the welfare state, because differently from
their native counterparts, they are endowed only with labor-related assets.
9 In order to simplify the analysis, we only consider two extreme cases
in terms of the adjustment of the welfare state. However, it is possible to
extend this framework and consider intermediate cases, where both tax
rates and per capita benefits adjust. In that case what will matter is whether
the adjustment takes place relatively more along one dimension, as
opposed to the other. Ruling out measure zero events—when no adjust-
ment dominates—either one set of predictions or the other holds.
10 See, for example, Luttmer (2001), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005),
Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), Caplan (2002), and the literature sur-
veyed below.
11 See Hanson (2005), Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005, 2007), and
Dustmann and Preston (2004a, 2004b).
12 See Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Kessler (2001), Mayda (2006), and
O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006). See Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) and
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) for an alternative interpretation of the
empirical evidence.
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will give rise to a similar problem of omitted variable bias.
In order to isolate the labor market channel, previous studies
(Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006) compare the
correlation between skill and pro-immigration preferences
in the labor force versus out of labor force subsamples. Any
correlation should disappear for individuals out of the labor
force if the labor market is what is driving the result, which
is in fact what the previous literature finds. In this paper we
tackle the problem in a different way. By explicitly consid-
ering welfare-state drivers, our analysis provides a new and
more direct approach to differentiate between labor market
and public-finance determinants.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II surveys
the literature related to this paper, while section III presents
the two theoretical models. In section IV we describe the
data used in the empirical analysis, whose results are pre-
sented in section V. Finally, section VI concludes.
II. Literature
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature.
The first investigates the impact of immigration on the
welfare state and has shaped the debate about immigration
policy in the United States, Europe, and other destination
countries. Borjas and Hilton (1996) and Borjas (1999b), for
instance, have extensively documented how immigrant
households that have relocated to the United States during
the 1980s and 1990s are more likely to receive welfare
benefits than the native population. While most of the
existing gap in participation rates can be explained by
observable characteristics, this is evidence of the growing
pressure put on state and federal budgets by “new Ameri-
cans.”13 Looking at a large sample of E.U. countries, Boeri,
Hanson, and McCormick (2002) point out instead a sub-
stantial dispersion in the immigrants’ participation in the
welfare state. Furthermore the paper shows that, while
immigrants are on average more likely than natives to be on
the receiving end of unemployment and family benefits, this
turns out not to be the case for old age pension benefits.14
Finally, Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) analyze the extent
to which, in the long run, immigration affects the redistri-
bution carried out by the welfare state. In a very elegant
theoretical model the paper shows how—somewhat surpris-
ingly—the presence of a fiscal leakage from the native to
the foreign-born population is likely to play against redis-
tribution toward the less skilled.15
The second set of papers related to our work looks, more
specifically, at how welfare-state considerations affect indi-
vidual perceptions of immigration. Hanson, Scheve, and
Slaughter (2007) investigate the impact of both public-
finance and labor market variables on individual preferences
over globalization—migration and trade—in the United
States in 1992 and 2000. The empirical analysis shows that,
while the pre-tax cleavages in individual attitudes—work-
ing through the labor market channel—are similar for im-
migration and trade, the post-tax cleavages in opinions—
working through the public-finance channel are different.
The authors conclude that welfare-state considerations are
therefore important in explaining differences in individual
attitudes toward alternative globalization strategies. Han-
son, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) is the paper in the
literature closest to ours. From a theoretical point of view,
Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter’s (2007) analysis differs
from our work in that the authors do not consider the two
public-finance models we instead analyze, implicitly assum-
ing that the first one holds.16 From an empirical point of
view, while their paper focuses on the United States and
exploits the across-state variation in the data, our analysis is
a cross-country one. In addition, the main innovation of our
empirical analysis relative to Hanson, Scheve, and Slaugh-
ter (2007) is to incorporate data on the relative skill mix of
natives to immigrants, which varies considerably across
countries and affects whether immigrants represent a net
burden or benefit for the welfare state.17 The role of the
welfare-state channel in explaining attitudes toward immi-
gration is also highlighted in Hanson (2005), where a
“rights-based” immigration policy is proposed to limit the
burden put by unskilled immigrants on the welfare state.18
Dustmann and Preston (2004b) empirically analyze atti-
tudes toward immigrants in Great Britain using seven con-
secutive waves of an individual-level panel data set, the
British Social Attitudes Survey. The authors develop a
structural multiple-factor model that uses responses to var-
ious questions on racial, labor market, and welfare issues to
estimate the direct impact of the underlying three factors on
13 For an analysis of the long-run effects of immigration on the welfare
state in the United States, see also Smith and Edmonston (1997).
14 See Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002), table 3.2, p. 747. This
argument has been used by many policymakers in Europe to highlight the
potential role of immigration policy as a tool to deal with the difficulties
created by pay as you go social security systems in the presence of an
aging population. For a formal analysis, see Razin and Sadka (1999),
while Storesletten (2000) has studied how migration policy can be used to
sustain the existing welfare system in the United States. See also Haupt
and Peters (2003). Casarico and Devillanova (2003) consider the two
adjustment models in the analysis of the impact of immigration on the
social security system.
15 The intuition for this result is that, as the number of migrants grows,
a larger proportion of the fiscal revenues ends up in the hands of unskilled
immigrants, which implies that native taxpayers—among whom the me-
dian voter will most likely be counted—will opt for lower taxes.
16 Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter’s (2007) empirical work makes it
possible to distinguish between the two mechanisms. The results in this
paper are consistent with what we call the tax adjustment model. However,
this paper does not explicitly address the distinction between the two
scenarios.
17 Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2005) use across-state variation in the
skill composition of immigrants to the United States. This paper estimates
the impact of the latter variable on skill cleavages in U.S. immigration
opinions, but not separately for the labor market versus welfare-state
channels.
18 The basic idea is to differentiate the level of entitlement to public
benefits, depending on how long the immigrants have been in the host
country. The immediate effect of this policy would be a reduction in the
benefits available to immigrants through the welfare state.
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immigration attitudes. Using a similar structural multiple-
factor model on data from the 2002–2003 wave of the
European Social Survey, Dustmann and Preston (2004a)
focus on economic variables and analyze three alternative
channels through which individual attitudes toward immi-
grants are affected: labor market competition, public bur-
den, and efficiency considerations. Besides the methodolog-
ical approach, these two works differ from our paper since
the analysis focuses on a single country (Dustmann &
Preston, 2004b) or does not explore the cross-country het-
erogeneity in the effect of individual-level variables (Dust-
mann & Preston, 2004a). In addition, the welfare state is
implicitly assumed to adjust to immigration through
changes in tax levels.
Finally, our paper is also related to analyses of immigra-
tion preferences that focus on the labor market competition
hypothesis. Using data on the United States, both Scheve
and Slaughter (2001) and Kessler (2001) find that more
educated individuals are more likely to be pro-immigration,
which is consistent with a labor market story, as immigrants
to the United States are less skilled than natives on average.
Mayda (2006) and O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) extend the
analysis to a multicountry framework. Both papers find that
a key variable determining the sign of country-specific
correlations, between individual skill and attitudes, is the
relative skill composition of natives to immigrants. Using
both direct and indirect measures of this variable, individual
skill is estimated to be positively (negatively) correlated
with pro-immigration preferences if migrants are unskilled
(skilled). Our paper finds the same results but in a broader
framework, where the labor market interacts with the wel-
fare state.
III. Theoretical Framework
To analyze the effect of immigration on individual atti-
tudes we consider a simple two-factor HO model of a small
open economy19 with and without diversification in produc-
tion, and we augment it by incorporating a redistributive
welfare system, like in Dustmann and Preston (2004a).20 If
production is diversified, two goods are produced. Alterna-
tively, if the economy is not diversified, only one good is
produced. We can think of the two production factors as
unskilled (LU) and skilled labor (LS). They are combined
using a constant returns to scale technology yi  fi(LU, LS)
to produce output i  1,2. We will assume good 1 to be the
numeraire, so that its price will be normalized to 1, while p
will be the price of good 2. The economy is populated by a
set of N natives, indexed by n, and by a set of M immigrants,
indexed by m. Each native is endowed with one unit of labor
(either skilled or unskilled) and with an amount en  {eL,
eH} of the numeraire good, where eH  eL. As a result, we
can distinguish four different types of natives, based on their
skill levels and asset holdings.21 Immigrants are only en-
dowed with either one unit of skilled or unskilled labor.22
The total endowment of the numeraire good in the economy
is thus given by

n
en  E,
while the total supply of each skill is given by
Lj  jN  jM, j  U, S, (1)
where j and j are, respectively, the share of workers of
skill profile j in the native and immigrant populations, and
jj  jj  1. The key variable in our analysis of the
effect of immigration is the migrants to natives ratio, which
is defined as   M/N and which, for simplicity, we will
assume to be equal to 0 in the initial equilibrium. Further-
more, the number of natives will be held constant through-
out the analysis. A change in the immigrants to natives ratio
will impact the domestic availability of the two types of
skills in the following way:
Lˆ j
d 
j
j
 	j, (2)
where Lˆ j 
dLj
Lj and so on. Let wj be the (before tax) pre-
vailing wage rate, with wS  wU. Let ci(wU, wS) be the unit
cost function for good i. Wages and outputs are determined
by two sets of equilibrium conditions. Firstly, equilibrium in
the factor market requires supply to be equal to demand,
LU  y1

c1wU, wS

wU
 y2

c2wU, wS

wU
, (3)
LS  y1

c1wU, wS

wS
 y2

c2wU, wS

wS
. (4)
Secondly, perfect competition implies that firms earn non-
positive profits in equilibrium, that is,
1  c1wU, wS, (5)
p  c2wU, wS. (6)
19 Thus, since a small open economy without nontradable sectors takes
international prices as given, we abstract from the potential price effects
of immigration.
20 The main difference between our framework and theirs is that, while
we allow the welfare state to adjust to migration in two different ways,
they assume the adjustment to occur only through changes in tax rates.
21 As skilled individuals with a limited initial endowment could well be
poorer than low-skilled individuals with abundant assets, we allow for
individual skill and income to be not perfectly correlated, and we will
exploit this differential variation in the empirical analysis.
22 We make this assumption, following Razin, Sadka, and Swagel
(2002), to highlight the possibility of a welfare leakage effect from natives
to migrants.
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Assume that the government intends to levy an egalitarian
income tax consisting of a flat rate , accompanied by a
lump sum rebate b.23 The cash grant may be thought of as
capturing the provision of free public services, and for
simplicity we are assuming that migrants are entitled to all
public programs available in the destination country. Thus,
by design, our tax system is redistributive. The government
budget constraint can be written as
wULU  wSLS  E  bN  M. (7)
Immigration affects the well-being of the current residents
through three possible channels: tax rates, per capita trans-
fers,24 and labor market. The net income of a native n of
skill level j is given by
Ijn  1  Gjn  b, (8)
where Gjn  wj  en. The effect of immigration on her net
income can then be measured by
Iˆjn
d 
1  wj
wˆj
d
Ijn

Gjn
ˆ
d
Ijn

b
bˆ
d
Ijn
. (9)
The first term represents the labor market effect, the second
is the effect through the adjustment in the tax level, and the
third term represents the adjustment induced in the govern-
ment’s transfers to the residents. We will now consider the
effect of immigration on the utility of current residents
under two different hypotheses. First, we will assume that
factor returns are not affected by immigration, and will call
this the “no labor market effect scenario.” Next we will
study the effect of immigration when a change in endow-
ments changes instead factor returns.
A. No Labor Market Effect
To gain some intuition on the importance of the type of
welfare-state response to immigration in shaping individual
attitudes, we consider a simplified setting in which one of
two adjustments can occur. In the first, which we label the
tax adjustment model, per capita transfers are held constant,
and the tax rate reacts to maintain the government’s budget
in equilibrium. In the second, which we call the benefit
adjustment model, tax rates do not change, while the per
capita transfers adjust. We start by analyzing the tax adjust-
ment model. Totally differentiating equation (7), after a few
manipulations we obtain
ˆ 
j
jLˆ j  d, (10)
where  j 
wjLj
iwiLi  E for j  U,S is the share of labor of skill
level j in total domestic income, and E  1  U  S is
the share of the initial endowment in total domestic income.
The effect of immigration on the tax rate is given by
ˆ
d 
U  U	U  1
1  U

E1  U
1  U
, (11)
where U  U is the difference between the share of the
unskilled in the initial population and their share in the
initial GDP. Since wU  wS, it follows immediately that
U  U. Consider equation (11) and to begin with,
assume that the share of initial endowment in national
income is nil, in other words, that E  0. If the native
and migrant skill compositions are identical, that is, if
	U  1, an inflow of immigrants will not alter the current
tax level. If instead immigrants are less skilled on aver-
age than natives, that is, if 	U  1, their presence will
lead to an increase in the tax rate. This is intuitive since,
in order to maintain the same per capita transfer, a
reduction in the per capita pre-tax income will require an
increase in the tax rate. If the share of the initial endow-
ment in national income is instead positive, that is, E 
0, the increase in the tax rate needed to maintain a given
demogrant in the presence of unskilled immigration will
be even higher. As immigrants in our model are assumed
not to own other assets besides labor, even if they are as
skilled as natives (that is, 	U  1), they represent a net
burden for the welfare state and this will require an
increase in the tax rate to maintain the demogrant un-
changed.25 The following proposition then holds.
Proposition 1 (tax adjustment model). Holding the de-
mogrant unchanged, an inflow of unskilled immigrants is
less desirable for an individual the higher her pre-tax
income. To the contrary, an inflow of skilled immigrants
is more desirable for an individual the higher her pre-tax
income as long as E  *E, where *E 
1	UUU
1U .
Proof. See appendix.23 The literature has suggested (Mirrlees, 1971) that the best egalitarian
income tax can be approximated by a linear tax. This strategy has been
followed for instance by Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002), among others.
24 The first two channels work through the welfare state. In our model,
we assume that the government’s budget constraint must be satisfied in
each year. In practice, immigration might also affect the welfare state
through its impact on the accumulation of public debt. While explicitly
modeling this channel would render the analysis more complicated,
allowing for the accumulation of debt would only shift into the future the
choice between changing taxes or benefits to accommodate immigration.
25 A similar “fiscal leakage” effect has been modeled by Razin, Sadka,
and Swagel (2002). Notice also that, the more unskilled immigrants are,
the higher the tax increase required to maintain the demogrant unchanged.
To see this, notice that

 ˆd

U

U(1  E)  U
U(1  U)  0 since U 
U
U  S
.
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Proposition 1 tells us that, if the demogrant is held fixed,
the redistributive nature of the existing fiscal system implies
that the cost of an inflow of unskilled immigrants will fall
disproportionately more on higher-income natives. Simi-
larly, if immigration is skilled in nature, the higher-income
natives will be the largest beneficiaries since they will enjoy
a disproportionately large decrease in their net tax burden.
To see how the relationship is affected by a change in the
extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare state, we
need to calculate the following derivative:
d
 Iˆd

G 
d  
ˆ
d
2bG
b  G1  3, (12)
which is negative as long as immigration is unskilled since
ˆ
d  0. In other words, the negative relationship between
individual income and pro-immigration preferences (ac-
cording to the tax adjustment model and given unskilled
migration) becomes more pronounced the more redistribu-
tive the welfare system is.
We turn now to the benefit adjustment model, in which
tax rates are held fixed, and the government’s budget is kept
in equilibrium by changes in the demogrant. Totally differ-
entiating equation (7), we have
ˆb
d 
U  U1  	U
1  U

E1  U
1  U
. (13)
Also in this case, if E  0 and 	U  1, migration will
have no effect on the demogrant. On the other hand, since
U  U, unskilled immigration (that is, 	U  1) will lead
to a decline in the per capita transfers,26 while skilled
immigration (	U  1) will lead to an increase. If E  0, the
reduction in the demogrant that follows from an inflow of
unskilled immigrants will be even larger. In fact a positive
share of initial endowment in national income implies that
natives are richer, ceteris paribus, than the immigrants in the
initial equilibrium. As a result, the effect of unskilled im-
migration on the demogrant, holding the tax fixed, will be
more pronounced.
The following result characterizes the effect of immigra-
tion on the current residents.
Proposition 2 (benefit adjustment model). Holding the tax
rates fixed, an inflow of unskilled immigrants is less desir-
able for an individual the lower her pre-tax income. To the
contrary, an inflow of skilled immigrants is more desirable
for an individual the lower her pre-tax income as long as
E  *E, where *E 
1 	UU U
1 U .
Proof. See appendix.
The result in proposition 2 is fairly general and the
intuition is straightforward. The inflow of unskilled immi-
grants will—for a given tax rate—reduce the demogrant
paid to every native. The reduction in the demogrant will
have a larger impact on the individuals with a smaller
income. The opposite is true—that is, the increase in the
demogrant will have a more positive impact on low-income
individuals—if immigration is instead skilled, and the share
of the initial endowment in national income is small. To see
how the relationship is affected by a change in the redistri-
bution carried out by the welfare state, we need to calculate
the following derivative:
d
 Iˆd

G 
db  
bˆ
d
G1    b
b  G1  3, (14)
which is positive if migration is unskilled as long as G(1 
)  b.
B. With Labor Market Effects
We turn now to the second setting, in which the economy
is initially specialized in the production of only good 1.
Factor returns are then determined by the following set of
equations:
1  c1wU,wS, (15)
LU  y1

c1wU,wS

wU
, (16)
LS  y1

c1wU,wS

wS
. (17)
Totally differentiating the equilibrium conditions, it is easy
to show that the effect of immigration on wages is given by
wˆU
d 
	U  	S
εUU  εSU  US εUS  US εSS
, (18)
wˆS
d  
U
S
	U  	S
εUU  εSU  USεUS  US εSS
, (19)
where εij 

Li

wj
wj
Li. From these two equations, we immediately
see that only if immigrants share exactly the same skill
composition as natives, there will be no wage effects. If the
skill composition of immigrants is different from that of the
natives, then there will be wage effects. In particular, an
inflow of unskilled immigrants will lead to a reduction of
26 Furthermore, as is intuitive, the more unskilled immigrants are, the
larger will be the reduction in the demogrant. To see this, notice that

 bˆd

U

U  U (S U)
U(1  U)  0 since
U
U

S
S
.
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the wage of domestic unskilled workers, while the opposite
will hold for skilled workers.27
Turning back to the effect of immigration on the welfare
state when wages adjust, holding the demogrant unchanged
(tax adjustment model) the impact on the tax rates of skilled
and unskilled immigration can be rewritten as
ˆ
d 
U  U	U  1
1  U

E1  U
1  U
 
j
j
wˆj
d.
(20)
On the other hand, holding the tax rates constant and
allowing the demogrant to adjust (benefit adjustment
model), the impact of immigration on the demogrant be-
comes
bˆ
d 
U  U1  	U
1  U

E1  U
1  U
 
j
j
wˆj
d.
(21)
In both situations, we can see that now the effects on the
two dimensions of the welfare state will be mediated by the
labor market. At the margin, labor is paid the value of its
marginal product, so a marginal inflow of immigrants will
leave the total remuneration of the existing labor force
unchanged (j j
wˆj
d  0) and have no effect on the redistri-
bution carried out by the welfare state. On the other hand, if
the inflow of immigrants is nonmarginal (that is, ), the
total remuneration of existing workers will rise (j j
wˆj
 
0)28 and relax the government’s budget constraint.29
IV. Data
To empirically investigate these theoretical predictions,
we combine individual-level information on immigration
attitudes with aggregate data on the characteristics of des-
tination countries. In particular, we use survey results from
the 1995 National Identity Module of the International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which covers advanced,
middle-income, and developing economies. We restrict the
sample and only focus on higher-income countries, which
are the best suited for the analysis of welfare-state determi-
nants. First, the salience of migration issues is lower in
countries with few immigrants and these tend to be coun-
tries with lower income, which are the ones we exclude
from our sample. In addition, our sample selection excludes
poorer countries in Eastern Europe which were in 1995 in
the early stages of the economic transition and for which a
Western-style welfare state was just beginning to emerge
(see for instance Campos & Coricelli, 2002).30
To construct a measure of immigration attitudes, we use
respondents’ answers in the ISSP survey to the following
question: “There are different opinions about immigrants
from other countries living in (respondent’s country). By
“immigrants’ we mean people who come to settle in (re-
spondent’s country). Do you think the number of immi-
grants to (respondent’s country) nowadays should be: (a)
reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the same as it
is, (d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot.” The survey
format also allows for “can’t choose” and “not available”
responses, which we exclude from the sample. We also
leave out observations for individuals who are not citizens
of the country where they are interviewed. The dependent
variable in our empirical analysis, pro-immig dummy, is
dichotomous and equal to 1 for respondents who would like
the number of immigrants to increase (either a little or a lot)
and equal to 0 otherwise.31 Our empirical analysis is based
on estimation of probit models (the tables report coefficient
estimates). All specifications have robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering on country,32 to address heteroske-
dasticity and allow for correlation across individual obser-
vations within the same country, and include destination
27 This result follows from the concavity of the cost function, which
implies that the sign of the denominator of equations (18) and (19) is
negative. See Dustmann and Preston (2004a) for a proof.
28 These are the gains from migration pointed out by Berry and Soligo
(1969) and Borjas (1995).
29 In the theoretical model, we have considered three economic channels,
that is, the welfare-state channel, the labor market channel, and the
efficiency channel. The assumptions in the model (small open economy,
the absence of a nontradable sector, and homothetic and identical prefer-
ences across individuals) imply that we abstract from the price channel.
That is, migration does not have a differential impact on various income
groups through price changes. In a more general model, immigration
could have effects on commodity prices—for example, in the presence of
a nontradable sector and/or individuals belonging to different income
groups might be characterized by different consumption baskets. Thus, in
a general setup, heterogeneous individuals might have different prefer-
ences over immigration because of price effects. The only empirical paper
we have found on these issues is Cortes (2006), which uses highly
disaggregated U.S. data at the city level. She finds that immigration affects
the prices of nontraded goods and services; however, her evidence sug-
gests that the effect of immigration on the cost of living indexes does not
differ substantially across income groups. In particular, across U.S. cities
the average decrease in the cost of living due to immigration in the 1990s
is very similar for high school dropouts, high school graduates, and
college graduates (0.92%, 0.94%, and 0.96%, respectively; see table 14 in
the appendix of her paper).
30 In particular, our sample includes countries with per capita GDP
(PPP-adjusted) in 1995 above 8,000 international dollars: Austria, Canada,
Czech Republic, East Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, United States, West Germany. Italy is excluded from
regressions that use real income, as this variable is not available.
31 We have checked the robustness of our results to various alternatives
with respect to how the dependent variable is constructed (for example,
keeping the “can’t choose” and “not available” observations; defining the
middle category (c) as pro-immigration; using as dependent variable a
five-valued ordered measure; and so on).
32 There is no consensus in the literature regarding whether standard
errors should be simply “robust” or also “clustered by country.” Therefore,
we also run the regressions with standard errors set to be robust and find
very similar results.
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countries’ fixed effects,33 to account for the impact of
unobserved, additive, country-specific effects. These inter-
cepts make it possible to net out the impact of country-level
variables which is homogeneous across fellow citizens (for
example, the linear effect of migration policy, of the state of
the economy, or of the skill composition of natives relative
to immigrants).34
Summary statistics for pro-immig dummy and all the
other ISSP and country-level variables used in the empirical
analysis are presented in tables 1 and 2. The fraction of
individuals in the overall sample who are in favor of
33 Fixed-effect estimation of a probit model may give rise to the
so-called incidental parameter problem (Chamberlain, 1984): the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator of the incidental parameters (fixed effects) is
consistent as T3 , for given N (assuming that there are T observations
for each unit i  1, . . . , N). However, it is inconsistent for given T, as
N3 . Given that the panel data set we use is very long (N small, T high,
since there are many individual observations for each country), the
incidental parameters problem is not an issue in our case.
34 Therefore, these country-level variables cannot be included in the
estimating equations (unless interacted with individual-level regressors);
otherwise they would be perfectly collinear with the country dummy
variables.
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES (ISSP DATA SET)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pro-immig dummy 13,605 0.0786 0.2691 0.0000 1.0000
Pro-trade dummy 7,966 0.2797 0.4489 0.0000 1.0000
Age 13,605 44.7291 16.0457 14.0000 96.0000
Male 13,605 0.5048 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000
Log of real income 13,605 9.1908 1.2025 3.9616 11.6643
Education (years of education) 13,605 12.0949 3.4868 1.0000 20.0000
Pro-immig crime 13,605 0.2711 0.4445 0.0000 1.0000
Pro-immig culture 13,605 0.5130 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000
Upper social class 6,364 3.4239 1.0982 1.0000 6.0000
Trade union member 6,364 0.4419 0.4966 0.0000 1.0000
Political affiliation with the right 6,364 2.8914 0.9559 1.0000 5.0000
Pro-immig dummy is based on responses to the following question: “Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent’s country) nowadays should be reduced a lot (1), reduced a little (2), remain the same
as it is (3), increased a little (4), increased a lot (5); can’t choose; NA.” Pro-immig dummy  1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 if they are either (1), (2), or (3). Can’t choose and NA are
treated as missing values.
Pro-trade dummy is based on responses to the following question: “Now we would like to ask a few questions about relations between (respondent’s country) and other countries. How much do you agree or
disagree with the following statements: (respondent’s country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy: 1  agree strongly; 5  disagree strongly; can’t choose; NA.”
Pro-trade dummy  1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 if they are either (1), (2), or (3). Can’t choose and NA are treated as missing values.
Male is coded as follows: 1 male, 0 female (i.e., missing values are excluded). Log of real income is calculated using data in local currency on individual yearly income from the ISSP-NI data set and
purchasing-power-parity conversion factors from the WDI (World Bank). Upper social class is coded as follows: 1  lower, 2  working, 3  lower middle, 4  middle, 5  upper middle, 6  upper. Trade union
member equals 1 if the individual is a member of a trade union, 0 if he is not. Political affiliation with the right is coded as follows: 1  far left, 2  center left, 3  center, 4  right, 5  far right.
Pro-immig crime is based on responses to the following question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Immigrants increase crime rates: 1  agree strongly; 5  disagree strongly.”
Pro-immig crime  1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5); 0 otherwise. Pro-immig culture is based on responses to the following question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following
statement? Immigrants make (respondent’s country) more open to new ideas and cultures: 1  disagree strongly; 5  agree strongly.” Pro-immig culture  1 if answers to the above question are either (4) or (5);
0 otherwise.
Summary statistics for pro-immig dummy, age, male, log of real income, education, pro-immig crime, and pro-immig culture are based on the same observations as in regressions 1–3 and 5–7 in table 5.
Summary statistics for pro-trade dummy are based on the same observations as regression 6 in table 7.
Summary statistics for upper social class, trade union member, and political affiliation with the right are based on the same observations as regression 4 in table 5.
TABLE 2.—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES BY COUNTRY (ISSP DATA SET) AND OF COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Country
Pro-Immig
Dummy
Pro-Trade
Dummy Education
Log of Real
Income
Per Capita
GDP
Relative Skill
Composition Benefits Progressivity
Labor Tax
Rate
United States 0.0805 0.1326 13.4257 9.6637 27,395 3,350 8.0000 29.1050
Norway 0.0743 0.2920 12.6633 9.6180 24,694 5,374 11.3000 40.6000
Japan 0.1568 0.3600 11.8682 9.6473 23,212 7,645 5.8000 29.3630
Canada 0.2061 0.2855 14.7612 9.9558 23,085 1.6709 2,433 11.9000 30.3440
Austria 0.0395 0.1679 10.3555 9.2601 22,090 2.5329 6,181 10.4000 39.6070
Germany West 0.0282 0.3854 10.9086 9.4788 21,479 4.0923 4,438 12.9000 40.2100
Germany East 0.0199 0.2312 10.9497 9.1904 21,479 4.0923 4,438 12.9000 40.2100
Netherlands 0.0547 0.3930 12.6851 9.9000 20,812 2.6941 7,166 15.9000 49.7960
Italy 0.0355 0.2315 11.0284 20,513 0.6374 3,475 8.8000 42.1830
Sweden 0.0671 0.2468 11.4111 9.5651 20,031 1.3362 5,879 11.0000 53.0110
Great Britain 0.0413 0.1433 11.3209 9.8841 19,465 2.2523 2,163 6.0000 24.5040
New Zealand 0.1159 0.2513 14.3098 9.5682 17,706 2,705 5.8000 24.9920
Ireland 0.1910 0.2260 12.2490 9.1528 17,264 0.3950 2,370 15.5000
Spain 0.0844 0.1107 10.1275 9.0672 15,163 0.4668 1,899 10.0000 36.9000
Slovenia 0.0186 0.2619 10.6766 8.7888 12,978
Czech Republic 0.0244 0.2778 12.9111 8.6610 12,426 4.9000
Hungary 0.0148 0.0992 10.4914 8.1421 9,315 16.9000
Slovak Republic 0.0302 0.2566 11.8364 5.9451 8,487
Per capita GDP is for 1995, PPP (current international dollars). The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives
and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with levels 2 and 3 of education to the number of individuals with level 1 of education. The RSC uses
data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 1995. Benefits is per capita transfers in 1995. Progressivity is equal to the difference in average income tax rates applied to single individuals without children who
earn, respectively, 167% and 67% of the annual wage earnings of an average production worker (OECD, 1998). Labor tax rate is the 1990 labor tax rate. See table 1 footnote for definitions of pro-immig dummy,
pro-trade dummy, education, and log of real income.
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immigration is low (7.9%). However, this fraction hides
substantial cross-country variation. In Canada and Ireland,
respondents are the most pro-immigration, in Hungary the
least. In contrast, attitudes are much more favorable toward
an alternative dimension of globalization, international
trade. In the overall sample, 28% of individuals welcome
free trade, with the highest fraction being in the Netherlands
and the lowest one in Hungary.
Additional immigration questions are included in the
ISSP survey. For example, individuals are asked whether
they agree with the statement that immigration increases
crime rates and whether they think that immigration makes
the country more open to new ideas and cultures. We use
answers to these questions to construct two variables, pro-
immig crime and pro-immig culture, which capture each
individual’s perception of the security and cultural impact of
immigration, respectively. In some specifications we control
for these two regressors which measure two important
aspects of the perceived noneconomic impact of migration.
By comparing two individuals who feel the same in terms of
these dimensions, we are better able to isolate the economic
channels. At the same time, when we include pro-immig
crime and pro-immig culture, we might be underestimating
the effect of economic variables, because of the possible
endogeneity of the two variables: that is, an individual
might be against immigration for economic reasons and, as
a consequence, express anti-immigration views from a
crime or a cultural point of view.
The ISSP data set also includes information on a number
of individual-level characteristics that define the socioeco-
nomic background of each respondent (for example, the
age, gender, number of years of education, real income,
social class, political affiliation, and trade union member-
ship of the person interviewed). The two variables of inter-
est for our analysis are the individual’s number of years of
education and real income. We use data on the former to
construct a measure of individual skill (education) and test
the labor market predictions of the model. We employ data
on individual real income to test instead the predictions on
welfare-state determinants. In particular, the variable in-
come is calculated using data from the ISSP data set on
individual yearly income in local currency and purchasing-
power-parity conversion factors from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (World Bank).35
The theoretical predictions about the impact of immigra-
tion on natives’ preferences, through both the welfare-state
and the labor market channels, are different (indeed oppo-
site) depending on the skill composition of natives relative
to immigrants in the destination country. Following Mayda
(2006), we use two alternative measures of such skill mix.
While the first one is a direct measure, it can only be
constructed for a limited number of countries, for which the
following data are available. We use information on 1995
education levels of both native and immigrant populations,
which comes from the International Migration Statistics
data set for OECD countries (OECD, 1997). Education
levels are coded according to the International Standard
Classification of Education (ISCED): (i) less than first stage
of second level (ISCED 00, 01, 02);36 (ii) completed second
stage of second level (ISCED 03, 04); (iii) completed third
level (ISCED 05 and over); (iv) other general education, not
applicable, and no answer. The relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants is defined as the ratio of skilled to
unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant
populations. We measure the ratio of skilled to unskilled
labor, for both natives and immigrants, as the number of
individuals with education levels 2 and 3 divided by the
number of individuals with education level 1. In particular,
the variable we use in the regressions, relative skill ratio,
equals the log of (one plus) the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants.37 The higher the relative skill ratio,
the more unskilled immigrants are compared to natives.38
The indirect measure we employ for the relative skill
composition of natives to immigrants is the (log) per capita
GDP of the destination country in 1995 (PPP-adjusted),
from the World Development Indicators. Consider the stan-
dard international migration model with no productivity
differences across countries. From a theoretical point of
view, in this case the relationship between destination coun-
tries’ per capita GDP and immigrants’ skill mix (relative to
natives) is unambiguous. High per capita GDP countries
have a higher supply of skilled to unskilled labor than low
per capita GDP countries, therefore lower skilled wages and
higher unskilled wages. This creates an incentive for un-
skilled migrants to move from low to high per capita GDP
countries, while skilled migrants will tend to move in the
opposite direction. Therefore, this simple model predicts
that the relative skill composition of natives to immigrants
is high in higher-income countries and low in lower-income
countries. If we drop the unrealistic assumption of equal
technology levels across economies, the pattern of interna-
tional migration in terms of skill composition is ambiguous,
since rates of return can be higher—than in the rest of the
world—for both types of labor in a technologically ad-
vanced country. Therefore, in general, the relationship be-
tween destination countries’ per capita GDP and the relative
skill composition of natives to immigrants becomes an
empirical question. Based on a sample of fourteen countries,
for which data on both variables are available (OECD,
1997), Mayda (2006, figure 1) shows that per capita GDP in
35 See the footnote of table 1 for definitions of variables based on the
ISSP questions.
36 ISCED level 02 usually refers to individuals who have completed the
ninth grade.
37 In terms of the notation in the theoretical model, the relative skill ratio
equals log(1  	U/	S) where 	U/	S  1 if and only if 	U  1 (this is the
case of unskilled immigration).
38 The relative skill ratio measure is likely to understate the actual skill
level of natives to immigrants, in all countries, for two reasons. First, the
immigration statistics used are for legal migration. Second, educated
immigrants often work in occupations that require lower skills than their
education level.
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1995 is indeed positively and significantly correlated with
the relative skill composition for the same year. Based on
this evidence, we can therefore use per capita GDP levels as
a proxy for the relative skill mix. Our first set of estimates
is based on the latter indirect measure, as it is available for
a larger number of countries. Robustness checks in table 7
use the direct measure for the relative skill composition
described above.
We also test the predictions of our model using informa-
tion on the size of destination countries’ welfare states
(labor tax rates and per capita benefits), which comes from
two sources. Data on labor tax rates are taken from Men-
doza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), as extended by Milesi-
Ferretti, Mendoza, and Asea (1997) and Daveri and Tabel-
lini (2000). To compute average labor income tax rates,
these papers use fiscal revenue statistics. Figures on per
capita transfers are taken from Razin, Sadka, and Swagel
(2002) and are based on the OECD analytical database. Per
capita transfers include both social security and other trans-
fers, such as unemployment and disability compensation,
and are deflated using each country’s CPI, and expressed in
1990 PPP equivalent dollars.
In order to measure how redistributive a welfare system
is, we construct an indicator of the progressivity of the tax
system in the host countries, which is based on data from
OECD (1998). In particular, we use information on average
income tax rates (that is, personal income tax due as a
fraction of gross wage earnings) for single individuals
without children who earn, respectively, 67% and 167% of
the annual wage earnings of an average production worker
(see table 1 in OECD, 1998). Our measure of the progres-
sivity of the tax system, progressivity, equals the difference
in tax rates applied to these two groups.
Finally, we complement our investigation based on the
ISSP survey using an additional individual-level data set,
the 2002–2003 round of the European Social Survey (ESS),
which covers a different (and larger) sample of countries
than the ISSP39 and was run in a different period of time.40
The immigration question we examine in the ESS data set is
also more specific than the one contained in the ISSP, as it
focuses on immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as
the majority in the country.41 The main advantage of this
more narrowly phrased question is that it abstracts from
racial and ethnic considerations, which could bias the esti-
mates on individual skill and income. On the other hand, the
disadvantage of the ESS data set is that the income variable
is not continuous, therefore it is subject to measurement
error.42
As before, we exclude nonnationals from the sample and
construct a dichotomous variable, pro-immig dummy-ESS,
which equals 1 if the individual would like many or some
immigrants (of the same race and ethnic group as the
majority), 0 otherwise (that is, if the individual would like a
few immigrants or none). Summary statistics of pro-immig
dummy-ESS and the other ESS variables included in the
regressions are presented in table 3. The different picture
these numbers portray relative to the ISSP data set—in
particular, the higher fraction of individuals in favor of
migration—is not surprising given that in the ESS survey
the immigration question is asked in relation to immigrants
of the same race and ethnic group as the majority.
Using pro-immig dummy-ESS as the dependent variable,
we estimate probit models which include, as regressors,
country dummy variables and have robust standard errors
clustered by country.43 We combine the European Social
Survey with aggregate statistics on the destination countries
of immigrant flows. Data on per capita GDP of the desti-
nation country in 2002 (PPP-adjusted) have been obtained
from the World Development Indicators data set. The rela-
tive skill ratio variable is constructed using 2002–2003 data
on native and immigrant populations by level of education
(lower secondary education, upper secondary, tertiary) from
table I.12 in SOPEMI (2005).
V. Empirical Results
As the theoretical model shows, the impact of immigra-
tion on natives’ preferences through the welfare-state chan-
nel is a function of individual income. On the other hand,
the effect of immigration on natives’ attitudes through the
labor market channel is a function of individual skill. In our
empirical specifications, we will use both variables to dis-
entangle the two effects. Notice that, besides employment
income, our individual-level measure of real income also
includes interests and dividends, rents received on real
estate, and the like. Thus, while not surprisingly individual
income and individual skill are positively and significantly
correlated,44 they are far from being perfectly collinear,
which makes it possible to analyze them in conjunction.
In particular, the theoretical models in section III derive
the following predictions. Through the welfare-state chan-
nel, if per capita transfers are fixed, tax rates are adjustable,
and the tax system is redistributive (tax adjustment model),
the more affluent an individual is, the less favorable he
should be to immigration if he resides in a country where
39 As with the ISSP data set, we restrict the ESS sample and only focus
on higher-income countries: Austria, Belgium, (Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, Slovenia.
40 For more information on the construction of the survey, see Jovell et
al. (2003). The data are available from the Norwegian Social Science Data
Services.
41 In particular, the survey asks: “To what extent do you think [country]
should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]
people to come and live here? 1. Allow many immigrants to come and live
here; 2. Allow some; 3. Allow a few; 4. Allow none; 7. Refusal; 8. Don’t
know; 9. No answer.”
42 See definition of income in the footnote to table 3.
43 As recommended on the ESS Web site, our estimation uses both
design and population size weights.
44 Their correlation coefficient in the overall ISSP sample is 0.34
(significant at the 1% level).
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natives are on average more skilled than immigrants. Thus,
in such countries, the relationship between individual in-
come and pro-immigration attitudes should be negative. On
the other hand, according to the tax adjustment model,
richer households should favor immigration more than
poorer households in countries characterized by skilled
migration. Therefore, in such countries, we would expect a
positive correlation between individual income and opin-
ions in favor of immigrants (proposition 1). Next, consider
the benefit adjustment model—that is, a model in which the
adjustment in the fiscal position of the welfare state to
immigration takes place through changes in per capita
welfare benefits with tax rates kept fixed. Still assuming a
redistributive tax system, the correlations between income
and pro-immigration attitudes should have exactly the op-
posite signs for each type of skill mix of natives to immi-
grants. We should observe a positive relationship between
income and pro-immigration attitudes in countries with
unskilled immigrants relative to natives and a negative
relationship in countries with skilled immigrants relative to
natives (proposition 2). Finally, through the labor market
channel, skilled (unskilled) individuals should be in favor of
(against) immigrants in destinations characterized by un-
skilled immigration. Therefore we should observe a positive
correlation between skill and pro-immigration attitudes in
these countries. The opposite is true for countries where
immigrants are skilled relative to natives. These predictions
are summarized in table 4.
We bring these theoretical predictions to the data in tables
5 and 6–8. We investigate the empirical validity on aver-
age45 of either one of the two welfare-state models, control-
ling for the impact of labor market effects.
Our initial set of regressions (columns 1–4, table 5), where
we assume a common coefficient on individual-level variables
across countries, illustrate basic patterns in the data. Ceteris
paribus, older individuals and women are less likely to favor
immigrant inflows, even though the latter effect is not always
45 In our analysis, because of the low number of country observations,
we assume that all countries follow either the first model or the second
one. In other words, we test the validity of each model on average across
countries.
TABLE 3A.—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES (ESS DATA SET)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Pro-immig dummy 29,248 0.6451 0.4785 0.0000 1.0000
Year of birth 29,248 1955 18 1893 1988
Male 29,248 0.4838 0.4997 0.0000 1.0000
Real income 29,248 2.8104 1.7746 0.1111 12.0000
Education (highest level attained) 29,248 2.9800 1.4845 0.0000 6.0000
These summary statistics do not use design and population size weights.
TABLE 3B.—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES BY COUNTRY (ESS) AND OF COUNTRY-LEVEL VARIABLES
Country
Pro-Immig
Dummy Education Real Income
Per Capita
GDP
Relative Skill
Composition Benefits
Luxembourg 0.5429 2.6379 3.4873 59,977 2.0547 8310.9470
Ireland 0.7775 2.7174 1.8867 35,653 0.4043 3587.3380
Norway 0.7119 3.4791 3.7711 34,750 1.4222 6951.4750
Switzerland 0.7981 3.2322 4.5611 31,020 5.1932 7505.3120
Netherlands 0.6310 2.9866 3.4162 29,550 1.6595 5543.4070
Austria 0.4276 3.2512 3.0337 29,015 3.1415 6189.7400
Denmark 0.7482 3.1962 3.5789 28,957 1.1638 7317.9740
Belgium 0.6764 3.0236 2.8084 27,459 1.8042 5709.0030
United Kingdom 0.6345 2.9809 3.7550 27,176 2.0380 5042.1450
France 0.6331 2.9979 2.3630 26,613 3.5085 6309.9100
Sweden 0.8866 2.9907 3.2947 26,468 1.4150 6587.4060
Finland 0.5808 2.8742 3.2209 26,018 1.2446 5775.8980
Italy 0.7053 2.3389 2.2621 25,554 5269.5770
Germany 0.7188 3.3340 3.2395 25,546 5.6564 6065.6310
Spain 0.5433 2.1593 2.1309 22,445 0.5475 3273.5390
Israel 0.7989 3.5000 1.9656 22,003
Greece 0.2754 2.2421 2.1162 18,834 0.8266 3082.1880
Portugal 0.4377 1.7066 2.0345 18,398 0.3275 2745.0350
Slovenia 0.6581 3.3278 1.5314 18,018
Czech Republic 0.5474 3.0845 1.8317 16,556 2.6415 2444.1780
Hungary 0.4942 2.2740 1.0678 14,159 0.6698
Pro-immig dummy equals 1 if the individual would like many or some immigrants (of the same race and ethnic group as the majority), 0 otherwise (that is, if the individual would like a few immigrants or none).
Real income is household’s total net income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of household members. Education (highest level attained) goes from 0 to 6 (not completed primary education;
primary or first stage of basic; lower secondary or second stage of basic; upper secondary; postsecondary, nontertiary; first stage of tertiary; second stage of tertiary). Per capita gdp in 2002 (PPP, constant 2000
international dollar) is from the World Bank.
The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants, the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured
as the ratio of the number of individuals with upper secondary or tertiary education to the number of individuals with lower secondary education. The RSC uses data on the stock of immigrants and natives in
2002–2003 (OECD, 2005). Benefits is per capita social expenditure in 1998 (at constant 1995 prices and PPP-adjusted).
These summary statistics do not use design and population size weights.
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significant. These first results also show that it is problematic to
analyze the welfare-state variable on its own, independently
from labor market and noneconomic determinants of immigra-
tion attitudes. Richer individuals are usually better educated
than poorer ones, which has implications for their position in
the labor market and for their view of immigration from a cultural
and security point of view. For example, controlling only for
the age and gender of the respondent, we estimate a positive
and significant coefficient on income in regression 1. However,
once we also account for the impact of individual skill (equa-
tion [2]) and of other noneconomic determinants of immigra-
tion preferences that are correlated with income (pro-immig
crime and pro-immig culture in regression 3; upper social
class, trade union member, political affiliation with the right in
regression 4), the effect of income becomes insignificant.
We next let the coefficients on individual skill and in-
come change by country, as suggested by the theory (re-
gressions 5–7). In these regressions, we use per capita GDP
as a proxy for the relative skill mix of natives to immigrants.
Since data on per capita GDP are available for all countries
analyzed, the sample size is not affected. In particular, in
column 6, we estimate the following probit model:46
Probpro-immig dummyi  1xi
	1agei 	2malei 	3incomei 	4incomei
 pcgdpc  	5educi  	6educi  pcgdpc,
46 This specification, as well as all the other ones in the paper, also
includes country dummy variables as regressors.
TABLE 5.—WELFARE-STATE AND LABOR MARKET DETERMINANTS USING AN INDIRECT MEASURE OF THE RELATIVE SKILL COMPOSITION (ISSP DATA SET)
Probit with country dummy
variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dependent variable Pro-Immig Dummy
Age 0.0074 0.0035 0.0031 0.0043 0.0039 0.0038 0.0034
0.0017*** 0.0014** 0.0015** 0.0025* 0.0015*** 0.0015** 0.0015**
Male 0.0474 0.0739 0.1062 0.0609 0.0773 0.0756 0.1063
0.0412 0.0413* 0.0414** 0.0614 0.0419* 0.0419* 0.0425**
Log of real income 0.1243 0.0192 0.0205 0.0032 0.0206 2.0979 2.3693
0.0385*** 0.0381 0.0418 0.0622 0.0382 1.0828* 1.0895**
Log of real income  gdp 0.2099 0.2371
0.1102* 0.1107**
Education (years of education) 0.073 0.0512 0.0697 1.0792 1.2332 1.169
0.0133*** 0.0112*** 0.0169*** 0.4279** 0.4315*** 0.4205***
Education  gdp 0.1168 0.1324 0.1236
0.0435*** 0.0439*** 0.0428***
Pro-immig crime 0.5016 0.498
0.0783*** 0.0801***
Pro-immig culture 0.5913 0.593
0.0876*** 0.0883***
Upper social class 0.0426
0.0237*
Trade union member 0.0086
0.0505
Political affiliation with the right 0.1561
0.0566***
Observations 13,605 13,605 13,605 6,364 13,605 13,605 13,605
Pseudo R-squared 0.1 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18
gdp is the per capita GDP in 1995, PPP. The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the constant
is not shown). Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
See footnotes to tables 1 and 2 for definitions of variables. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects.
TABLE 4.—CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PRO-IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES AND, RESPECTIVELY, SKILL AND INCOME THROUGH THE LABOR MARKET
AND THE WELFARE-STATE CHANNELS
Relative Skill
Composition Skilled Immigration Unskilled Immigration
Channel
Labor
Market
Welfare State
Labor
Market
Welfare State
Tax Adjustment
Model
Benefit Adjustment
Model
Tax Adjustment
Model
Benefit Adjustment
Model
Corr. b/w attitudes
and Skill Negative Positive
Corr. b/w attitudes
and Income Positive Negative Negative Positive
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where () represents the cumulative distribution function
of a standard normal, 	 is a vector of parameters to be
estimated, and xi is the vector of all explanatory variables
specific to individual i, who is from country c. In regression
7, we augment this specification by adding the two regres-
sors pro-immig crime and pro-immig culture. Based on these
specifications, we find evidence of substantial cross-country
heterogeneity in terms of the impact of both skill and
income. The effect of the two variables is characterized by
the opposite pattern across countries. Our estimates show
that, while the impact of education on pro-immigration
preferences is positive in higher per capita GDP countries
(	6  0) and negative in lower per capita GDP countries
(	5  0), the effect of individual income is negative in
higher per capita GDP countries (	4  0) and positive in
lower per capita GDP countries (	3  0).47 Therefore, our
results are consistent with a labor market plus welfare-state
explanation of attitudes toward immigrants in a framework
characterized by fixed welfare benefits, adjustable welfare
costs (tax rates), and a redistributive fiscal system (tax
adjustment model).
We confirm that the estimated coefficients in regression 7
imply the above-stated effects for countries in our sample,
i.e., the threshold values of per capita GDP such that the
correlations change sign fall within the range of values in
our sample. We find that pcgdp*E such that (	5educi 
	6educi  pcgdp*E)  0 equals $12,809 and that pcgdp*I
such that (	3incomei  	4incomei  pcgdp*I)  0 equals
$21,869. These threshold values are also consistent with
table 6, which reports the marginal effects of education and
income at different values of GDP per capita (the marginal
effects are based on the coefficient estimates of regression
7).48 We find that, for example, while in the United States
doubling real income decreases the probability that the
respondent is pro-immigration by 0.5 percentage points, in
the Slovak Republic it increases it by 6. In the United States,
one more year of education raises the likelihood by 1
percentage point, whereas in the Slovak Republic it de-
creases it by 1.1 percentage points. While these numbers
appear small, they are large in relation to the mean of the
dependent variable which is only 7.9 percentage points.
Next, we use the marginal effects from table 6 in figure 1,
which provides additional evidence on the cross-country
pattern of the impact of skill and income. In particular, we
plot the estimated marginal effects of education (income) on
the top (bottom) panel of figure 1 as a function of the 1995
per capita GDP of the destination country. The top graph
shows a positive and significant (at the 1% level) correlation
between the host country’s per capita GDP and the size of
47 Using the coefficient estimates of regression 7, we calculate the
marginal effects for income and education and their interaction variables
and find that they are of the same sign as the corresponding coefficients.
To calculate the marginal effects of interaction variables, we use the Stata
command predictnl which gets around the problems pointed out in Ai and
Norton (2003).
48 To calculate the marginal effects of education and income, we have
used Clarify. This is a routine that draws 1,000 sets of coefficients from a
multivariate normal with mean equal to the maximum likelihood coeffi-
cient estimates (the beta hats) and variance equal to the variance covari-
ance matrix of these estimates. For each of the 1,000 sets of parameters,
Clarify calculates two probabilities: first, the predicted pro-immigration
probability when all the individual-level variables are equal to their
overall sample means and the aggregate level variables are equal to each
country’s specific values (each country’s per capita GDP and coefficient
on the country dummy variable); second, the predicted pro-immigration
probability when either the real income measure is doubled or the measure
of education is augmented by one unit, while all other individual-level
characteristics are held fixed. Clarify then computes the difference be-
tween the latter and the former predicted probabilities. Finally, Clarify
provides the sample mean—which represents the marginal effect—stan-
dard errors and corresponding confidence intervals over the distribution of
1,000 values of the difference in probabilities.
TABLE 6.—THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMPACT OF EDUCATION AND INCOME ON IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES (ISSP DATA SET)
Country Marginal Effect of Education Marginal Effect of Log Real Income Per Capita GDP
USA 0.0091 [0.0069 0.0116] 0.0046 [0.0117 0.0019] 27,395
Norway 0.0093 [0.0073 0.0116] 0.0031 [0.0098 0.0035] 24,694
Japan 0.0179 [0.0142 0.0217] 0.0035 [0.0163 0.0094] 23,212
Canada 0.0110 [0.0091 0.0132] 0.0020 [0.0098 0.0058] 23,085
Austria 0.0060 [0.0043 0.0080] 0.0002 [0.0044 0.0042] 22,090
21,869
Germany West 0.0030 [0.0020 0.0042] 0.0002 [0.0019 0.0024] 21,479
Germany East 0.0025 [0.0014 0.0040] 0.0002 [0.0016 0.0020] 21,479
Netherlands 0.0040 [0.0031 0.0051] 0.0007 [0.0023 0.0037] 20,812
Sweden 0.0057 [0.0043 0.0073] 0.0021 [0.0025 0.0069] 20,031
Great Britain 0.0035 [0.0023 0.0050] 0.0017 [0.0014 0.0050] 19,465
New Zealand 0.0052 [0.0036 0.0069] 0.0064 [0.0001 0.0133] 17,706
Ireland 0.0066 [0.0046 0.0089] 0.0102 [0.0003 0.0203] 17,264
Spain 0.0033 [0.0009 0.0058] 0.0139 [0.0033 0.0257] 15,163
Slovenia 0.0001 [0.0009 0.0012] 0.0077 [0.0016 0.0156] 12,978
12,809
Czech Republic 0.0003 [0.0022 0.0015] 0.0138 [0.0028 0.0271] 12,426
Hungary 0.0027 [0.0055 0.0004] 0.0198 [0.0027 0.0434] 9,315
Slovak Republic 0.0113 [0.0231 0.0023] 0.0634 [0.0082 0.1424] 8,487
This table presents the marginal effects (and corresponding 90% confidence intervals in brackets) of education and log real income, country by country (ISSP data set). To calculate the marginal effects of education
and log real income, we have used Clarify and have set all the individual-level variables equal to their overall-sample means (see table 1). For the aggregate-level variables we have used each country’s specific
values, that is each country’s per capita GDP and coefficient on the country dummy variable. The marginal effects in this table are based on the coefficient estimates of regression 7, table 5.
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the effect of education (as in Mayda, 2006). On the other
hand, the bottom graph displays the opposite type of pattern,
a negative and significant (at the 1% level) correlation
between the destination country’s per capita GDP and the
marginal effect of income. In other words, the richer the
destination country, the more positive the impact of indi-
vidual skill on pro-immigration attitudes and the more
negative the impact of individual income.
Based on the regressors of this specification (regression 7,
table 5), we also investigate the relative importance of labor
FIGURE 1.—THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMPACT OF EDUCATION AND INCOME ON IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES (ISSP)
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This figure is based on the MEs in table 6. The slope of the line is 9.41e-07, significant at the 1% level (robust standard errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the
squared standard error of the marginal effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change and the level of significance is still 1%.
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This figure is based on the MEs in table 6. The slope of the line is 2.38e-06, significant at the 1% level (robust standard errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the
squared standard error of the marginal effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change and the level of significance is still 1%.
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market and welfare-state determinants of attitudes. We es-
timate a linear (OLS) regression using the ordered variable
immig opinion as the dependent variable.49 We start with a
specification that only includes the sociodemographic, non-
economic, and labor market regressors (age, male, educ,
educ  pcgdp, pro-immig crime, pro-immig culture plus
country dummy variables) and next add the welfare-state
variables (income, income  pcgdp). The difference be-
tween the two R2 measures is the fraction of the total
variance that is explained by public-finance drivers, after
accounting for the contribution of sociodemographic, non-
economic, and labor market determinants plus country
dummy variables. If we repeat the same exercise including
first the sociodemographic, noneconomic, and welfare-state
regressors plus country dummy variables, and next the labor
market variables, the R2 increases by slightly more than
before.50 Therefore, while this paper uncovers the signifi-
cant role played by public-finance issues across countries, it
also finds that labor market determinants are marginally
more important than welfare-state variables, in terms of
variance explained.
In table 7, we check the robustness of our results in a
number of ways.51 First, in place of per capita GDP, we use
the direct measure of the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants described in section IV (regressions 1
and 2).52 Although these estimates are based on a smaller
sample of countries because of data limitations,53 they are
characterized by the same sign patterns as those using per
capita GDP and by the same levels of significance (this is
true for both the labor market and welfare-state variables).
Based on specification 2, the estimates for income (0.1411,
significant at the 10% level) and income*relative skill ratio
(0.1643, significant at the 5% level) imply that individuals
49 Immig opinion ranges from 1  “reduced a lot” to 5  “increased a
lot.”
50 The difference in the two changes of R2 is half of a percentage point.
51 For numerous additional robustness checks of the labor market results,
see Mayda (2006). For example, Mayda (2006) shows that the correlation
between education and pro-immigration preferences disappears if the
sample is restricted to individuals out of the labor force. This says that the
effect of skill is indeed working through the labor market channel. The
labor market results are also confirmed when data on individual occupa-
tion are used: respondents in occupations that experience a higher inflow
of immigrants are less likely to be pro-immigration (Mayda, 2006).
52 The skill composition of immigrants is shaped by migration policy
which, in turn, is a function of attitudes. However, in an individual-level
analysis such as this one, reverse causality is not an issue, since each
individual has an infinitesimal impact on the aggregate policy outcome.
53 Regressions 1 and 2 are based on the following countries: Austria,
Canada, Germany East, Germany West, Great Britain, Ireland, Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden.
TABLE 7.—WELFARE-STATE AND LABOR MARKET DETERMINANTS USING A DIRECT MEASURE OF THE RELATIVE SKILL COMPOSITION (ISSP DATA SET)
Probit with country dummy variables 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable Pro-Immig Dummy Pro-Trade Dummy
Age 0.0054 0.0041 0.0048 0.0047 0.0047 0.0006
0.0023** 0.0020** 0.0020** 0.0023** 0.0019** 0.0013
Male 0.0381 0.0803 0.0705 0.063 0.0728 0.321
0.0521 0.0616 0.0456 0.0552 0.0469 0.0384***
Log of real income 0.137 0.1411 0.1203
0.0620** 0.0770* 0.0434***
Log of real income  relative skill ratio 0.1545 0.1643 0.0574
0.0661** 0.0774** 0.0552
Education (years of education) 0.024 0.0382 0.5194 0.4269 0.0723 0.0391
0.0082*** 0.0076*** 0.1715*** 0.0990*** 0.0434* 0.0141***
Education  relative skill ratio 0.1063 0.1006 0.5254 0.5012 0.2429 0.0359
0.0103*** 0.0109*** 0.3194* 0.1023*** 0.0534*** 0.0096***
Education  benefits 0.065
0.0210***
Education  relative skill ratio  benefits 0.0551
0.0379
Education  labor tax rate 0.0105
0.0024***
Education  relative skill ratio  labor tax
rate
0.0102
0.0024***
Education  progressivity 0.0043
0.0032
Education  relative skill ratio  progressivity 0.0112
0.0037***
Pro-immig crime 0.488
0.0815***
Pro-immig culture 0.6087
0.1411***
Observations 7,641 7,641 10,451 9,539 10,451 7,966
Pseudo R-squared 0.13 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.1
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the constant is not shown). Robust standard errors,
clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. The relative skill ratio is the log of one plus the relative skill composition. See the footnotes to tables 1 and 2 for definitions of variables.
DOES THE WELFARE STATE AFFECT INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRANTS? 309
from countries with relative skill composition above ap-
proximately 1.36 are less likely to be in favor of immigra-
tion the higher their income, while in countries with relative
skill composition below this threshold (Ireland, Spain, and
Sweden in our sample), the correlation between pro-
immigration attitudes and income is positive.54 Using the
coefficient estimates of regression 2, we calculate the mar-
ginal effects of education and income at different values of
the relative skill composition (table 8). Figure 2, which plots
the two sets of marginal effects as a function of the relative
skill composition, provides evidence that is very similar to
what we find in figure 1.
Our next robustness checks exploit the variation across
countries in the size and progressivity of the welfare state.
In regressions 3–5, table 7, we follow Hanson, Scheve, and
Slaughter (2007) and estimate specifications where we use
education as a proxy for the level of both individual skill
and individual income. In order to differentiate between the
labor market hypothesis and the welfare-state one, we use
data on the size and progressivity of the welfare state in
each destination country. In particular, in column 3, we
estimate the following probit model:55
Probpro-immig dummyi  1xi
 1agei  2malei  3educi  4educi  RSRc
 5educi benefitsc 6educi RSRc benefitsc),
where RSR stands for relative skill ratio and benefits repre-
sents per capita benefits in 1995. The two terms 3educi and
4educi  RSRc capture the labor market effect, while the
following two terms (5educi  benefitsc and 6educi 
RSRc  benefitsc) provide evidence on the welfare-state
channel. If the welfare state is relatively small in a destina-
tion country (for example, benefits are equal to 0), we
expect the effect of education to reflect only labor market
considerations. That is, we should find that the impact of
education is positive in countries where natives are more
skilled than immigrants on average (4  0) and negative in
countries where immigrants are more skilled than natives on
average (3  0). On the other hand, the bigger the size of
a destination country’s welfare state, the more important
welfare-state determinants should be in shaping prefer-
ences, and therefore the more likely it is that the effect of
education is consistent with propositions 1 or 2.56 Recall
that, using direct information on income, we found results
consistent with the tax adjustment model, where per capita
benefits are assumed to be fixed and tax rates adjust follow-
ing immigration (proposition 1): in this case, higher-income
individuals oppose unskilled immigrants and favor skilled
ones. Therefore, in regression 3, we should find 6  0 and
5  0. These are indeed the signs of the terms in education
in regression 3. These estimates are based on a limited
number of countries, but they provide evidence that is
consistent with our previous results, thus confirming their
robustness. The two sets of determinants—labor market and
welfare-state ones—produce opposite results in terms of the
impact of education.
The latter findings are confirmed in specification 4, which
uses an alternative measure of the size of the welfare state,
that is, labor tax rates. We find that, if labor tax rates are low,
the coefficient on education is consistent with the labor
market hypothesis (negative and positive in correspondence
of, respectively, skilled and unskilled migration) but has the
opposite sign if labor tax rates are high, once again strength-
ening our previous results. Finally, we investigate the same
set of issues by differentiating countries according to the
progressivity of their tax system (regression 5, table 7). The
theoretical model predicts that the income-distribution ef-
fects of welfare-state variables should be more pronounced
the more redistributive the tax system is (see equations [12]
and [14]).57 On the contrary, with zero redistribution, the
labor market channel should prevail, even in countries with
54 Notice that these results are qualitatively similar when we interact
each of the four main terms with the 1995 size of the immigrant inflow, as
a fraction of the destination country’s population.
55 This specification, as all the other ones in the paper, also includes
country dummy variables as regressors.
56 In addition, the theoretical model predicts that the income-distribution
effects of welfare-state variables should be more pronounced the larger the
size of the welfare state (see equations [12] and [14]).
57 Of course, our underlying assumption is that a more progressive tax
system is more redistributive.
TABLE 8.—THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMPACT OF EDUCATION AND INCOME ON IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES (ISSP DATA SET)
Country Marginal Effect of Education Marginal Effect of Log Real Income Relative Skill Composition
Germany West 0.0064 [0.0044 0.0089] 0.0047 [0.0093 0.0002] 4.0923
Germany East 0.0050 [0.0027 0.0081] 0.0036 [0.0073 0.0001] 4.0923
Netherlands 0.0068 [0.0054 0.0083] 0.0046 [0.0100 0.0008] 2.6941
Austria 0.0088 [0.0064 0.0115] 0.0055 [0.0123 0.0013] 2.5329
Great Britain 0.0069 [0.0045 0.0097] 0.0040 [0.0106 0.0017] 2.2523
Canada 0.0108 [0.0087 0.0130] 0.0034 [0.0142 0.0071] 1.6709
1.36
Sweden 0.0057 [0.0040 0.0077] 0.0003 [0.0067 0.0074] 1.3362
Spain 0.0001 [0.0030 0.0037] 0.0145 [0.0002 0.0321] 0.4668
0.46
Ireland 0.0010 [0.0051 0.0032] 0.0195 [0.0005 0.0401] 0.3950
This table presents the marginal effects (and corresponding 90% confidence intervals in brackets) of education and log real income, country by country (ISSP data set). To calculate the marginal effects of education
and log real income, we have used Clarify and have set all the individual-level variables equal to their overall-sample means (see table 1). For the aggregate-level variables we have used each country’s specific
values, that is each country’s relative skill composition and coefficient on the country dummy variable. The marginal effects in this table are based on the coefficient estimates of regression 2, table 7.
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sizable welfare states. Our estimates in specification 5 are,
once again, consistent with these implications and with our
previous results. To conclude, we believe that our main
specifications and additional robustness checks provide
strong empirical evidence for the interaction of labor market
drivers of preferences with welfare-state ones, along the
lines of the tax adjustment model.
In the last column of table 7 we consider respondents’
preferences with respect to an alternative dimension of
globalization, free trade of goods and services. We use the
FIGURE 2.—THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC IMPACT OF EDUCATION AND INCOME ON IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES (ISSP)
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This figure is based on the MEs in table 8. The slope of the line is 0.0014, significant at the 16% level (robust standard errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the
squared standard error of the marginal effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change, although the significance level decreases.
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This figure is based on the MEs in table 8. The slope of the line is 0.0053, significant at the 2% level (robust standard errors). We also estimate the line using WLS (with weights equal to the inverse of the
squared standard error of the marginal effect of each country): the sign of the correlation does not change and the level of significance is 14%.
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same regressors as in regression 1, table 7, with pro-trade
dummy as the dependent variable.58 Our goal is to investi-
gate whether cleavages in trade attitudes mirror those for
immigration. If that was the case, we might worry that our
results are not driven by the welfare-state channel since
trade openness is not likely to have as large an impact as
immigration on public finances in advanced countries.59 In
any case, even if this were not true—that is, trade liberal-
ization significantly affects the welfare state60—we do not
expect the effect of public-finance issues on trade prefer-
ences to be a function of the relative skill composition of
natives to immigrants. As our results on trade preferences in
regression 6 of table 7 show, the effects estimated in our
previous regressions are indeed specific to immigration
attitudes.
Finally, the results based on the ESS data set offer
empirical evidence that is remarkably similar to what we
found using the ISSP survey. As the estimates in table 9
show, individual attitudes toward immigrants in the ESS
sample are on average consistent with the tax adjustment
model (the coefficient on income is positive and negative
given, respectively, skilled and unskilled migration) and
with labor market determinants (the coefficient on education
is negative and positive given, respectively, skilled and
unskilled migration). To conclude, given the difference in
country coverage of the sample, in the questionnaire date
and wording of the immigration question relative to the
ISSP survey, the ESS results represent an important robust-
ness check of the conclusions of this paper.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a simple theoretical
framework to study the effect of a redistributive welfare
state on individual attitudes toward immigration. We have
highlighted that this effect depends in a fundamental way on
how the welfare state adjusts to an inflow of foreign work-
ers. In particular, we have shown that high-income individ-
uals are worse hit by unskilled immigration only if taxes are
raised to maintain per capita transfers unchanged (tax ad-
justment model). At the same time, agents at the bottom of
the income distribution will suffer more with unskilled
immigration if tax rates are kept constant and the adjustment
is carried out through a reduction in the per capita transfers
(benefit adjustment model). These relationships are reversed
in the case of skilled migration.
Using two different surveys of individual attitudes toward
58 See definition of pro-trade dummy in the footnote to table 1.
59 As Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007) note, “Immigrants may pay
taxes, may receive public services, and may vote over tax and spending
choices. Imports, obviously, do none of these things” (p. 1). In general, the
fiscal costs of trade adjustment assistance programs are limited.
60 An alternative view is that trade liberalization has a considerable
impact on the welfare state since the demand for social insurance increases
with free trade (Rodrik, 1998).
TABLE 9.—WELFARE-STATE AND LABOR MARKET DETERMINANTS (ESS DATA SET)
Probit with country dummy variables 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Pro Immig Dummy-ESS
Year of birth 0.0049 0.0084 0.0045 0.0053 0.0063
0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0014*** 0.0010***
Male 0.0536 0.0734 0.0512 0.0454 0.0431
0.0296* 0.0286** 0.0376 0.0437 0.0354
Real income 1.3658 1.0075 0.0229
0.6598** 0.4151** 0.0132*
Real income  gdp 0.1284 0.0969
0.0647** 0.0407**
Real income  relative skill ratio 0.0026
0.0087
Education (highest level attained) 1.3381 1.4043 0.1047 2.7551
0.9378 0.8275* 0.0453** 1.1820**
Education  gdp 0.1489 0.1562
0.0921 0.0813*
Education  relative skill ratio 0.0638 2.613
0.0299** 1.2033**
Education  benefits 0.3423
0.1404**
Education  relative skill ratio  benefits 0.3023
0.1407**
Observations 37,879 30,546 30,405 26,830 31,553
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08
The sample excludes all individuals who are not citizens of the country where they are interviewed. The table reports coefficient estimates for probit regressions (the constant is not shown). Robust standard errors,
clustered by country, are presented under each coefficient. As recommended in the ESS Web site, our estimation uses both design and population size weights. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. All regressions in this table control for country fixed effects. real income is household income (expressed on a scale from 1 to 12) divided by the number of household members. The relative skill ratio is
the log of one plus the relative skill composition. The relative skill composition (RSC) is the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor in the native relative to the immigrant populations. For both natives and immigrants,
the ratio of skilled to unskilled labor is measured as the ratio of the number of individuals with upper-secondary or tertiary education to the number of individuals with lower-secondary education. The RSC uses
data on the stock of immigrants and natives in 2002–2003 (OECD, 2005). benefits is per capita social expenditure in 1998 (at constant 1995 prices and PPP-adjusted).
gdp is per capita GDP in 2002 (PPP, 2000 international dollars) and is from the World Development Indicators (World Bank).
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migrants, we have brought the predictions of the two models
to the data. Differently from the existing literature, we have
carried out our investigation taking full advantage of both
the cross-country and individual-level variation in the data.
The results we obtain are on average consistent with the tax
adjustment model, that is, with an adjustment to immigra-
tion that is carried out through changes in the tax rates. In
particular, we find that high-income individuals oppose
immigration through this channel in countries where immi-
gration is unskilled and therefore a net burden to the welfare
state. The data suggest an opposite pattern when migration
is skilled. In this case the correlation between income and
pro-immigration preferences is positive, which is consistent
with a situation where migrants are perceived as net con-
tributors to the welfare state.
More generally, we find that the income-distribution ef-
fects of immigration as perceived by individuals are less
pronounced than pointed out in the existing literature. Indi-
vidual skill and income have opposite effects on individual
attitudes. Since skill and income are positively correlated,
the labor market and welfare-state channels partially offset
each other. For example, the very same skilled and high-
income German businessman may feel ambivalent regard-
ing the arrival of unskilled immigrants since he might
benefit from hiring them (labor market complementarity)
but be hurt by paying their way through the welfare state.
Finally, in our model we have used the skill composition
of natives relative to immigrants to capture whether immi-
gration will be a net burden or contribution for the public
finances of the host countries. In practice, while unskilled
labor flows are likely to represent a net burden, the same
young immigrants have been portrayed by some as the
answer to the deteriorating conditions of the welfare state in
destinations with aging populations. In particular, in many
OECD economies, pay as you go social security systems are
the main vehicle through which retirement benefits are paid.
Thus, another interesting question to consider is how dif-
ferences in the age structure and fertility rates of natives
relative to immigrants can affect individual attitudes toward
immigration. This question represents an important direc-
tion for future research.
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APPENDIX
1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Notice that, absent labor market effects and holding the de-
mogrant constant, equation (9) implies
Iˆ
d  
G
b  G1    ˆd .
From equation (11) we know that if immigration is unskilled, ˆd  0 and
thus
Iˆ
d  0. The opposite is true if immigration is skilled and E  *E. To
assess the effect of different individual income levels, notice that

 Iˆd

G  
ˆ
d bb  G1  2 .
If immigration is unskilled, which implies
ˆ
d  0, then

 Iˆd

G  0. On the
other hand, if immigration is skilled, from equation (11) we know that
ˆ
d  0 as long as E 
1 	UU U
1 U and, as a result,

 Iˆd

G  0.
2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Without labor market effects and holding the tax rates un-
changed, equation (9) becomes
Iˆ
d 
b
bˆ
d
b  G1  .
To assess the effects of different individual income levels, notice that

 Iˆd

G  
b
bˆ
d1  
b  G1  2.
We have seen that with a redistributive tax system, unskilled immigration
leads to a reduction in the per capita transfers ( bˆd  0) therefore

 Iˆd

G 
0. With skilled immigration,
bˆ
d  0 as long as E 
1  	U) (U  U
1  U and
therefore

 Iˆd

G  0.
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